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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE 
GRAKT ~IACFARLAXJ£, SR. } Case Xo. 9051 
HEtiPONDKN'l"S P!';'l'l'l'ION FOR 
RJ<jf!EAHING A1'D BHU:GF IX SUP .PORT nn;HJWF 
PETITION" FOH REllEARIN<; 
'l'hc respondent, Grant lllacfarlane, ~r., IJeti!ion;; tlw 
Court for a rehearing and reargument of thi;; ('a.~e upou 
the following grounds; 
POINT I. 
THE COURT HAS 1\'IISINTERPRE'TED THE RECORD 
A::-TD THE CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT, AND HAS 
APPROVED FI~DT:t--'GS WITHOUT SUPPORTING EVI-
DEXCE, SO THAT ITS DECISlON SHOULD BE RECALLED 
A~D THE CASE REHEARD. 
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POINT II. 
THE PU)TISHMENT RECOMMENDED BY THE BAR, 
AND DECREED BY THE COLRT, IS UNJUST AXD OP-
PRESSIVE IN VIE\V OF THE RECORD AND THE CIRCUM-
STA='!CES OF THIS CASE AND IN COMPARISON WITH 
WHAT HAS BEEN DECREED IN EARLIER DISCIPLINARY 
PROCEEDINGS, 
IVHhlH.EFORE, respondent prays that the judgment 
and opinion of the Court be recalled and a reargument 
be ordered of the entire case. 
A brief in support of this petition is filed herewith. 
JOHX H. 8XOW and 
HAHOI~D G. CHRIST.E:.)l"flhl='l 
~1ttorney8 for Petitioner. 
BRIEF IX SUPPORT 01!' 
.PJ£Tl'I'IO.:\ FOH HI•:HJ·;AIUSG 
POINT I. 
THE COURT HAS MISINTERPRETED THE RECORD 
AND THE CONTEKTIO))S OF RESPONDENT, AND HAS 
APPROVED FINDINGS WITHOUT SUPPORTING EVI· 
DENCE, SO THAT ITS DECISION SHOULD BE RECALLED 
AND THE CASE REHEARD. 
The Ba1·, throughout this easf'. lw" Jli'YU n't"t'dt'd 
from iL~ ,·mwt'.~~ion at til(' pi"l'tl·inl hearil1g that it had 
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"no evidence of fraud lw.vond the presumption" an-
nounced by this court in the 'viii <'ontbt ca~c of In R.: 
SK(IIi's Estate,-± "Ctah :!d, :277, 293 P. :.ld 6S:2. 
The controversy wa::! litigated, Ly all participant«, 
on the issnf' of whether the preSUIHIJtion should he applied 
in a discplinary proeeeding lo the E>ame extent as it had 
been applied in the civil will eonl.est case. 
'l'he entire presentation of tile pro~ccution m this 
case consisted of selections rrom the transcript of testi-
mony given on trial ol" ln. lie c'·.,'-u;a.n'.1· EstaiP. 
Upon argument to the '!"ri.al Committee, the chief 
counsel for the Bar told tilt' TJ"ial ·Committee that he 
and his associates, as a _pro~c(·uting committee, lmd eon-
eluded that the ··matter mu~t turn on 1 he question of" 
whether there is or isn't a IJresumption of fraud in a 
di,;bal"l!tent proeeeding.'' (R. 3G!l) 
'l'he Trial Committee, in ih derif'ion, found as a. J'ad 
that the Court had utilized the prc~ttlllption in the will 
contest case, had held the pn·~umption ~hifted the burden 
of persuasion in that rase to the respondent, and that 
he l'ailed to sustain that burden. 
The Trial Commillec then concludL·d the· presumption 
applied in this di.~ciplinary proet>eding and that the 
burden of exoneration \Hi~ thrust again upou re~pondent. 
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The Board of Bar l'ummis8ioners approved the 
F.inding~ and Conclusion::; of the Trial Committee, "-ith-
out elaboration or comment. 
Thus, all members of the Bar conc;orncd ·with the 
conduct of this proceeding concluded that the j,;sue bein,, 
' presented to thi;; Court waE the effect, if any, in a di.Rci-
plinary proceeding, of the presumption of fraud and 
tmdue influene,D announeed in In Re Snilli'<; Estate. 
Becau;:;e of this background, it i;, difficult for ~~~ 
to understand and to acecpt the remarkable statement 
in the decision that the Court is "not con('erncd with the 
nicetlcs of the term 'presumption' ... " 
It is recognized that the theory of the case and the 
issue argued by opposing coumel may not be considered 
important by the Court in a matter of discipline. llow-
ever, as seems dear from the ded~ion of the ~ourt, 
more than ordinary reliance lia~ been placed h: the Court 
upon memben of the Bar and their elected l'f'lll'l'~enla· 
tives. It is said that tlw Court df'Pln~ it proper "to indnl~e 
considerable latitude'· to the adions of the Bar Com-
mission whose members it i~ >'aid are "pernliarl;• suited 
to be the arbiters" ol· ,;lmldanh of eondud of member~ 
of the Bur. 
'l'hc dP('i,.,ion purports lo rf'rlffirlll the rnJr. of proof 
111 these kinds nl' m~c:; Uwt 111i~conduet mn~t be proved 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
by ''clear and convmemg evidence.'' The Har, however, 
lms repeatedly eonceJed that it ha~ no evideme and 
that its entire case !'(·~l~ upon the prcHumption from !lie 
will contest case. 
In that case, the Court expre~;;ly and deliberately 
held that the pref'nmption there announe~·d is but "a rule 
or law" and the fa.d fimler cannot "<'onsidPr or weigh 
the prc~umpliou as evidence." In Re SKrur·.~ Ec,fate, :!!J:l 
P. 2d at Page 690. 
In the present decision, de::;pitc the unequivocal 
language just quo led, the Court has raised the prp;,ump-
tion to the ~tatn~ of evidence and Jw~ held that ·when 
the prc:;tunption i~ recogniy;cd, mere inference::; from 
the ''foundational facts'' are magieally tran::;formed into 
clear and couvirwing evidence. 
II' the inferenees to be drawn 1·1·orn the foundational 
facts in this caN~ have the strength and the power of 
clear and eonvineing evidence, then the holding of In 
lle Su.'an's f;.,·tate c·annot bo..• ~upported or justified. Obvi--
ously, such inference~ 'vere not ~o regarded by the 
Court in that ease, beeause the Court ther<c held that 
thf' inferences could be overeOIJle h;-- a nwre pre}Jolllkr-
ane<! of the evidenee, 11 hid1 wonld not have been the 
holding if the Court had concluded that ~uC'h inferem:1:~ 
had the force a~ j,; now atlribnteJ to them. 
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His significant to recall that ihe Court, on a record 
substantially identical as that now before it, did not 
choose on it,; own motion to discipline reRpond~nt fol-
lowing the rendition of the will conte~t decision. 
J!'our years have elapsed since In Re S1wn'J E8lute. 
X othing has oceurred in the meantime to strengthen or 
to enlarge the impact and encct of the inferences \Vhidl 
can be drawn from the foundational fads. 
'l'hc Bar lm::> never urged ail) greater effect from 
the inferences than the Court attributed to them in iL; 
will contest decision, and both the Bar and the Court, 
it would appear, have made a fundamental error in the 
prosecution and considcmtion of this case . 
That error comists in drawing the conclusion that 
only one inference can be drawn from these fact8 - M 
.inference of evil. 'J'hc Har and the Court have ignored 
any fact or any inference to the credit of I'C''lJOndent, 
and have brushed aside as inconsequential any sugge8tion 
that at least some favorable inferences ought to be drawn 
to the credit or respondent whose denial of misconduct, 
whose lifetime ~ivie, vrofr~sional and serviee standing 
and reputation, \H'l"l' apparently considered to be of more 
force and effect in the will contest ease than in a case 
whe1·e hi~ professional life i~ at stake. 
In it~ one paragraph o\\llll1W1l'~- or the "i'acts" pur-
portedly found by the 'l'rial Committee, there is ample 
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indication that only unfavorable infereneb have been 
drawn by the Coul"t from lhi::; record. For example, the 
( 'ourt ~tate~ that respondent ·'used his superior position 
and talents to ingratiate himself with llCr and to over-
reach and use undue inl'lncnee in hi~ dealing \vit II her ... " 
'l'here i~ no evidence to support this ;:;tatement, and even 
the 'J'rial CommiUce made no l'indings tu thi::; ef.l'ed. 
The Court then statP>< that there wa, ''a tnainten-
ance of joint bank net·ounts and careful protection ol 
funds available to respondent ther·cin." Sueh a state-
ment completely overlook~ the fart that respondent, im-
mrdiately after the death of the ler;tatri:.., delivered a 
pa88 book cvideneing the joint w:count with hi~ dient, 
to her executor who, as f'ound b,y the 'l'rial Committee, 
was not theretofore aware of its existence. 1 1', as stated 
Ly the Court, respondent had "carefully protec·ted" the 
funds available to him in such an aeconnJ, he woulcl 
have withdrawn the funU::~ prior to the dcatl1 of the 
te~tatrix and while she was in her terminal illnes::;, and 
it i,~ unlikely that the existence of this fund would have 
ever come to light. 
]<;qually untenable i:; the Htatement of the ·Court that 
"these matters ·were d~>liberatPly kept ~0rret from anyone 
else inclnding relative~, '1·ho, it mighl rcasonahl~· be~~~~~­
posed, would haYe aU.vised and rn·otl•dcd hL•r intl'J't~l;; 
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with respect thereto." Xo such finding was made by the 
Trial Committee. Mis Swan had but one heir. As i~ 
amply borne out by later event.~, an.1- advire which might 
have been reooivcd from that heir would rertaillly not 
have been for the protection of any interest other than 
that of the heir. This 11as recognized by :\Iiss S11an, 
who repeatedly told her busine>~s advi>wr, the \'ice-Presi-
dent of Walker Bank 6,:. Tru~t Company, of the reasons 
why she intended to dispo:;e of her property without 
substantial recognition of her heir. 
Respondent has never asked this Court to afford 
him a "review of the mental process'' of those whose 
Finding~ and Conclusions were under attad.:. )!either 
has respondent ru;swned that lhis proceeding follow~ 
the "usual pattern of a trial and appellate revic1\-." .All 
that respondent has ever asked, and all he asks now, 
i:> that if he is to be disciplined at the request of the 
llar, he should be afforded the "right to a review of the 
charges found against him" and that upon sudl. review 
this Court should be governed by the ~<wne rules that 
have governed tho~c who hav02 been charged in the past 
- that is, that the ''chargE'~ should be clearly sustained 
by convincing proof," that tJw l·vidence ·'~hould be clear 
:nul ,·,mvincinl-\",'' that "more than a }lreponderance of 
the evidenep" be fonnd aguin~t him and that his "~:,ruilt 
must IH' clearly estahli;;hed." In Rc Hwt .. wn, -t~ rtall 
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lli7, 158 P. 77S; In Re Riutts & Roger~,, :22 Dah :1GG, 
ti~ P. 913; In Be Jlc{'nllo11·9h, 97 Uah 5:33, 95 1'. :.\llJ. 
Although the l'ourt, in ib deeision in thi~ case, 
recognize~ •·the establi~heo:l rule" that. dear und convinc-
ing evidence is t·cquired, it has 110t followed that rule. 
In~tea.d, it hafl affirmed eonvietion by the usc nl' infer-
ence~ which, four ~·car~ Rgn, \I'L•re regarded by it as not 
being ~nbstantial evidencP of fraud and undue influence. 
Four ,Year~ ago, the Court rejh·tPd the rule that a pre-
~UJI\]llinn of tlrif' kind <'onld only be overcome by dear 
and convincing evidence, and instead held that the pre-
suruption could be overcome by a nH.Te prepondcrane~· 
of the evidence. In ne Swtlli'8 }!,'stale, at J-'agc G90. 
The preRenl deci:;;ion stale~ that the concern or the 
Court i,; "whether reasonable minds" migl1t infer from 
the fads sufficient force to meet "'the required slandar•l 
of proof." lt i~ intere.~ting to note that in thi6 deC'i~ion, 
a.-; in the decision in the ·will eonteRt rase, there has been 
a dissenL each time reaching a dirf'etly opposite re::mlt 
from that reached by the majority opinion <.'oneernmg 
the inferences to be drawn from the faets eoneernir1g 
respondent'::: condud. 
This might be of" no importance if, in tile present 
t·a~l', the Court \Hh indulging in "consideral1le latilttde" 
to tlJC members of the Bar and the Bar Conunis~ion upon 
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ihe familiar ground that they, as the fact finders, had 
a superior opportunH;v- to observe the witnesses and to 
determine credibility. 
Such is not the case here, however, becau~e this 
entire proceeding has been based and conducted upon a 
written record made in 1954 under completely diJferent 
cimumstances Kith completely different issues and in-
volving oomplctely different partie~;. Although respond-
ent has made himself available J'or unlimited cros:H~xa.m­
ination, no member of the Bar hw; ever asked him a 
single question from the time these proceedings began. 
The first hearing, by an iJ1vestigating wmmittee of 
the Bar, was ex pa-rte and \Yithout notice of any kind 
to respondent, although the Revised Rules of Discipline 
of the Ctah State Bar1 and the regulations promulgated 
under Section ~4 of such Revised Hules, elearly contem-
vlate notice, and the opportWiity to L'xplain informally 
thE' quest.ioned conduct. 
Thereafter, the Prosecuting Committee and the Trial 
Committee had thl' opportlmity to question respondent 
in order better to judge his credibility, to determine his 
motive~ or to learn whether it would be just as reasonable 
to drav.; good inf('JTlll'l'~, in~tf'ad of evil inferences, from 
the Jnd.nal rebtionship exi,;ting between him and his 
client. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II 
The respondent had told of his training and back-
ground, in rc~ponse to questions from his counsel. He 
had already repeatedly dcni~'d, by oral testimony and 
hy written pleading, I he accusations first made against 
him Ly the complaint in tlte will contc::;t ca,;e. 
\Vc suggest that each member of the Bm· who has 
been concerned \lrith this (·rtse dwse to remain silent and 
to ask no r1uestions of respondent be<.'au;;c all shared 
the view of the chief counsel for Ute Prosecuting Com-
mittee that the entire ismP in this case was a legal issue 
-namely, the effect of the presumption announced by 
the Court in the Swan ea;;e. 
Thus, at every stqJ ol' thi::J proceeding, there has 
been an avoidanee of an evidentiary l"inding of fraud 
and undue influenec and a ,;.;ubstiiution of the statement 
that the presumption of fraud and undlle influence ap-
plies. For the Court now t.o approve the recommendation 
of the Hoard of Bar t:onnnissioners, 11ithont either evi-
dence or finding ol' fraud and undue iul'luence, is lo ~m­
nounee a new rule in disciplinary vroceedings. 
l-ndcr such a rule, lawyers who cnkr into business 
ventures with their client~ will be mbjecting tbcmselves 
to future discipline nnless they enn prove a 1wgativc ---
that is, prove that tiloey did not take advantage of tlw 
client with \I hom t l1cy enjoyed a <.'onfidential relationship. 
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Under the rule of this cru:;e, the burden will hence-
forth be placed upon the attorney to exoncratf' himself, 
rather than upon the Bar t.o prove his guilt. 
It is res1wctfully suggested that the Court did not 
intend, by is decision, to change the long-standing rule 
concerning disciplinary proceedings in thit: .~tate. 
POINT II. 
THE PUNISR~\iE~T RECOII'nrE::-<DED BY THE BAR, 
AND DJ£CREED BY THE COURT, IS UNJUST AND OP-
PRESSIVE IN VIEW OF THE RECORD AND THE CIRCU!Ii-
S'TANCES OF THIS CASE A:\D I~ CG:ilPARISON WITH 
WHAT HAS BEEN DECREED IN EARLIER DISCIPLINARY 
PROCEEDINGS. 
Disciplinary proceedings are traditionally not de-
signed to punish the aooused, but, af'. stated by this Court 
in In Re Han""n, they "are intended more in the nature 
of an admonition to the aoou;;cd and to protect the public 
against future transgressions upon the part of the 
attorney ... " 
l<'or more than six year,;, ref'pondent ha~ lived, and 
attempted to practice law, under the cloud of the aceu-
sations embodied in thi~ proceeding. 
rn April, ]!I;J+. the trial court in tlK· Sll'illl ease filM 
n lengU1y ('ondellluntor~ opinion, arRusing n>o<pmu!ent ,,r 
lhe ('OIIIlllio<sion or fraud. 'l'liitl opinion rereind \\-ide-
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~pread new8papl'l' and radio publi(·ity. J•;ach recordation 
of a docwnent in that proceeding or in the disciplinary 
proceeding that follo1nKl haH received Cljttal attention 
from the press. 
It i:; difficult to seP how the respondent could be 
more thoroughly ''adrnoni:shed'' or l10w he could receive 
more pointed and thorough admonition than that which 
has already lJeen visited upon him. 
Re8pondcnt is lil years of age and his health .is 
impaired. A wspension for one year, at his age, is far 
more 6CVCn\ lw.r~il and oppreiiflive than would be a 
similar term imposed upon a younger lawyer with the 
greater part of his professional life before him. 
\Vhile it i" recognized that each ca~e mud he decided 
on its own facts, an examination of Ute dc('i~ion::> of !Iii>< 
Court in disciplinary proceedings in the past 25 year:o 
does not reveal a penall,v a~ relatively :;evere as that 
imposed in tills case. The earlier ea;;es are furthPr wortl1y 
or note because in each of them there was iu\-olved a 
transgression or written rules of conduct, or a 10tatutory 
violation, with evidentiary proof . 
.Precedent may be of little a;;~i~tance, but it i,; im-
pressive to note the difference in the method of review 
and penalty imposed in In Re illcCi!liOIIffll, !1/ Litalt :);;:;. 
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95 P. 2d 13, as eompared with the review and penally 
in the present case. 
The l.1cCullough case involved a :;erie~ of charges 
relating to sollcitation of personal injury litigation p<:r-
sonally and through a paid solicitor and giving false 
testimony under oath in a contempt proceeding. The 
court made a meticulous review of the evidBnce and con-
duded that there was dear proof of solicitation on one 
charge, but in considering another charge the court, 
while recognizing the evidcm:e pointed toward guilt, 
f'tated; 
"However, the evidence adduced is consistent 
. with Jack of knowledge upon the part of 
plaintiff ... " of the conduct of the alleged soli-
citor. 
The court was, U1erefore, giving the accused in that 
case the benefit of such favorable inference a~ might 
be drawn from the evidence but no ~uch benefit has been 
afforded the re~pondent in this case. 
Althoug-h till' reeord o:howed dearly the charge of 
o;olidtation upon McCullough, and further showed con-
duct de;;erving of the censure of the Court concerning 
the use of a paid solicitor, and although the Court found 
hin1 guilty ol" unprofessional condurt by withholding 
i nl"ormation from a lower court, he neYertheless received 
a 6UBpcn~ion of but 11ine montl1~ from the pm("tice of law. 
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If the Court in this rase condude::; that the finding 
of guilt should be reaffirmed, it is respeetfully suggested 
that the true purpose o£ this proceeding 11 ill be properly 
served without the intpoi<ition of the penally of a one 
year suspenswn. 
Such a penalty, in this ~ase, i" not far removed, 
in its ultimate effect, [rom dic;bannent. l!Jven if respond-
ent should later· be recommended for reinstatement after 
suspension, there ·would be but. little of his ]Jrofe<~sional 
life rernaining within which to attempt to rebuild his 
practice, in view of hi<~ age and his health. 
:\o good rea.6on appear" 1dry the Court could not 
decide for it~eH, apart from the recommcndalion of the 
Bar, what woulo:l con~titute ju::;tiee under these circum-
~lances, to the end that the prrhlie would reeeive ib pro-
tection and the re~pondent, his admonition. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOH.\' H. 81\0W and 
HAROLD G. CHHl~Tr;:;-.;-sgN 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Halt Lake City, Utah 
Att01uey8 for nespondent. 
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